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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 18-1691 and 18-3039 
(consolidated) 
__________ 
 
RAYMOND ALVES; MICHAEL CULBRETH; DERRICK SESSOMS;  
Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
MERRIL MAIN, Ph.D., in his official capacity as Clinical Director of the Special 
Treatment Unit; COMMISSIONER NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES; LYNN A. KOVICH, in her official capacity as Assistant Commissioner and 
Deputy Director of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY 
 
JOSEPH ARUANNO, 
                      Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-00789) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2019 
 
Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 10, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Joseph Aruanno appeals from two orders of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey, each of which denied his post-judgment motions for a 
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction and for appointment of a special 
master. 
Aruanno is a civilly committed sexually violent predator and a frequent litigant.  
The underlying matter (“Alves”) concerns a class action on behalf of residents at New 
Jersey’s Special Treatment Unit (“STU”).  Another similar case, Hasher v. Corzine, 
D.N.J. Civ. No. 07-cv-01212, was consolidated with Alves and a class settlement was 
reached in December 2012.  This Court affirmed.  See Alves v. Main, 559 F. App’x 151 
(3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (not precedential).1   
Aruanno subsequently filed two post-judgment motions for a temporary 
restraining order or preliminary injunction and for appointment of a special master.  (Dkt. 
#290, #307).  The District Court denied the first of those motions in an order entered on 
February 21, 2018 (Dkt. #302).  Aruanno’s timely appeal of that order was docketed at 
                                              
1 In 2014, the District Court granted Aruanno’s motion to reopen/reinstate, 
deconsolidating and severing claims filed in Hasher that were not part of the Alves 
settlement. Those claims were reinstated in Hasher; the District Court subsequently 
granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and this Court once again 
affirmed.  See Aruanno v. Corzine, 687 F. App’x 226 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (not 
precedential). 
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C.A. No. 18-1691.2  The District Court denied the second motion in an order entered on 
August 1, 2018 (Dkt. #310).  The timely appeal from that order was docketed at C.A. No. 
18-3039.  We have consolidated these appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  See United States v. Stewart, 452 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Assuming the post-judgment motions were properly filed (which we doubt), the 
District Court properly denied them.3  We agree with the District Court that they did not 
warrant the “extraordinary” relief requested.  See Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 
(3d Cir. 2018) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy . . . which should be 
granted only in limited circumstances.” (internal quotation omitted)).  The affidavits in 
support of Aruanno’s post-judgment motions contain a litany of alleged constitutional 
violations on the part of the STU, ranging from a “refusal to grant daily visitation from 
family, loved ones, and friends by DOC and DHS,” to the “policy and practice of locking 
civilian residents in a cell for long periods of the day.”  The District Court did not err in 
denying the motions, as the conclusory statements in his affidavits do not indicate a 
strong likelihood of success on the merits (indeed--there is now no underlying case on 
                                              
2 We denied Aruanno’s motion for appointment of counsel, filed in C.A. No. 18-1691. 
3 The District Court properly denied the motions under any conceivable standard of 
review.  Cf. Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018) (setting forth standard of 
review for denial of preliminary injunctive relief or temporary restraining order).  The 
Alves case was settled and closed years ago.  We are hard pressed to understand how 
Aruanno could be properly seeking any “preliminary” relief, or a “temporary” restraining 
order, when there was no case pending before the District Court.  The District Court 
declined to reopen the matter, see Dkt. #301 at 2 n.3, and properly informed Aruanno that 
“[a]ny further claims regarding the conditions of [his] confinement must be filed in a 
separate action,” id. at 3. 
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which to prevail) or irreparable injury that would support injunctive relief.  See, e.g., In re 
Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2015) (en banc) (explaining factors to be 
considered in ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction).4 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.  
                                              
4 Because there was no civil action pending before the District Court, the Court did not 
err in denying Aruanno’s motions for a special master. 
